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Abstract 
In 2005-6, the French Indian Ocean island of Réunion experienced a massive 
epidemic of the mosquito-borne viral infection Chikungunya. Reporting on the 
epidemic in the print media demonstrates a considerable lag compared to the real-
time evolution of the epidemic, and this paper explores possible reasons for that 
delay. We analyse the content of print media articles about Chikungunya from two 
Reunionese newspapers (Témoignages and Clicanoo) and two newspapers from 
metropolitan France (Le Figaro and Le Monde). In the Reunionese newspapers, the 
delay in acknowledging the public health risk posed by the virus suggests passive 
denial in the early stages of the epidemic, followed by acceptance with blame 
attributed to the French metropolitan government – reflecting the uneasy historical 
relationship between the Reunionese and the government. In the French 
metropolitan newspapers, the delay is even greater and may reflect the influence of 
residual colonialist thinking on the priority placed on reporting on an epidemic in a 
remote tropical location: once a risk to metropolitan France is identified, reporting 
intensifies considerably. The media representations also highlight the importance of 
belief systems as modulators of people’s risk perception and their subsequent 
health-protection behaviour. We suggest that a better understanding of these drivers 
of health behaviour in multicultural societies may provide important opportunities 
to reduce the community burden of disease.2  
                                                
1 Professor Philip Weinstein lectures in the School of Population Health at the University of Queensland and 
Professor Srilata Ravi lectures in the School of Humanities (European Language and Studies) at the 
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In 2005-6, the Indian Ocean island of Réunion, a French overseas department since 1946, 
experienced a massive epidemic of the mosquito-borne viral infection Chikungunya — an 
“emerging infectious disease” never before seen in the Indian Ocean.3 More than 250,000 
people, one third of the Island’s population, were subject to a sudden onset of high fevers, 
rash, and debilitating joint pains, with several deaths — yet the public health authorities in 
metropolitan France were arguably slow to take the epidemic seriously.  We have 
previously shown that discourses on tropicality and colonial distancing can help explain the 
slow reaction to the epidemic as represented in official public health bulletins from 
metropolitan France.4 We were also interested in comparing local representations of the 
epidemic with metropolitan ones, and therefore turned to newspaper articles about 
Chikungunya. Here we ask if residual colonialism and island identities influenced 
differences in print media representations of the risk posed by the virus, when comparing 
the content of articles about Chikungunya from two Reunionese newspapers (Témoignages 
and Clicanoo) and two newspapers from metropolitan France (Le Figaro and Le Monde). 
These newspapers were selected on the basis of representativeness of a broad crosssection 
of readership in both places: Témoignages has a distinctive Créole flavour (as evidenced for 
example by numerous interjections in the Créole language), and Clicanoo appeals to a 
broader Reunionese readership including French expatriates (Zoreilles); Le Figaro is 
widely acknowledged as having a right-wing agenda in metropolitan France and Le Monde 
is more broadly representative of public opinion, with its editorialists seen as “independent 
and committed intellectuals in the French tradition”.5 Our study covers all articles in these 
                                                                                                                                               
manuscript. The research was partially funded by the Graduate Research School at the University of Western 
Australia. 
3 An “emerging infectious disease” is defined as an infectious disease which is rapidly increasing in one or 
more of: the numbers of cases occurring, the geographical distribution of cases, or the severity of symptoms.  
Prominent examples include the recent pandemic of human HIV infections and the appearance of SARS. 
4 P. Weinstein & S. Ravi (2008) “The failure of colonial ‘distancing’: changing representations of the 2005-6 
Chikungunya virus epidemic in Réunion”, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 29: 221-35. 
5 P. Moores (2006) “Media demonization, ‘la fabrique de la haine’ and Le Figaro”, 
http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/MooresWJhtm, accessed 28/1/08; Le, E. (2004)  “Active participation within written 
argumentation: metadiscourse and editorialist's authority”, Journal of Pragmatics 36: 687. 



























newspapers from their first mention of Chikungunya, to the end of the epidemic in 
November 2006. We interpret our findings with reference to discourses on island identities 
as well as theories of risk perception that relate to unusual health events. 
 
Historical and Cultural Context of the Media Representations  
La Réunion is a full (overseas) department of France, of which it has been an integral part 
with the same administrative status as a départment in metropolitan France since 1946.  It 
does considerably better economically than the French average, with an economic growth 
rate of 4.9% compared to 1.2%.6 Expectations are therefore that the minimum wage, social 
security payments, and availability of education and health care in Réunion match the 
standards set by metropolitan France. These expectations have partly been met: the 
minimum wage was brought to the same level as metropolitan France in 1996, but welfare 
payments are still 20% lower; literacy is at 89% compared to 99% in France; and the infant 
mortality rate of 7.63/1000 is much lower than that of neighbouring Mauritius (14.59), but 
is still nearly double the rate in metropolitan France (4.21).7 Although much improved over 
the historical situation, these figures do suggest ongoing inequity — perhaps best illustrated 
by the unemployment rate, which at over 30% in Réunion remains more than three times 
the rate in metropolitan France, and the highest of any overseas department of France.8 The 
relationship between the Reunionese, the majority of whom are of mixed race, and their 
fellow French citizens in metropolitan France therefore might hide more persistent issues of 
discrimination and dependence than is at first obvious. As with many ‘colonised’ 
populations, discrimination against Créole Reunionese can persist either overtly or covertly, 
fuelled by the vicious cycle of lack of educational opportunity and socio-economic 
deprivation. To understand the evolution of this situation, it is important to appreciate the 
colonial history of the island, of which a short summary therefore follows. 
 
                                                
6 2005 data, INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques) (2006) Tableau 
économique de la Réunion, St-Denis, p.9. 
7 CIA (Central Intelligence Bureau) (2006) World Fact Book, http://sportsforum.ws/sd/factbook/index.html, 
accessed 4/6/06. 
8 INSEE 2006:125. 



























When first discovered by Malay and Arab mariners in the Indian Ocean in the 15th century, 
Réunion was uninhabited, and they left it thus. The European discovery by the Portuguese 
captain Pedro de Mascarenhas in 1512 also did not lead to settlement, and it was over a 
century and a half before the first human inhabitants actually took up residence — a dozen 
Frenchmen of dubious reputation, living in a cave from 1663. Thus there were no 
inhabitants when the French settled, no resistance to settlement, and no dispossessed and 
oppressed indigenous population following ‘colonisation’.9 African and Malagasy slaves, 
imported to support the growth of the coffee industry from 1715, certainly were oppressed, 
but not in any way that was different from the oppression of slaves elsewhere: they could, 
in fact, be considered to have been (relatively) fortunate to have benefited from the 
(relatively) benevolent rule of Mahé de la Bourdonnais, whose labour-saving management 
enabled many slaves to move away from hard labour and into artisanry.10 These slaves 
provided the basis of the island’s Créole community, later to be joined by large numbers of 
indentured labourers for the island’s sugar cane industry, chiefly from India and China, 
following the abolition of slavery in 1848. A brief period of economic prosperity ensued, 
with standards of living improving and the construction of roads and ports facilitating 
transport and communication. Later in the 19th century, the sugar crisis drove many small 
white landholders to retreat to the mountains to engage in small-scale subsistence farming, 
alongside freed slaves who had by then already adopted such a lifestyle. The resultant 
communities provided even greater opportunities for ethnic mixing than already existed on 
the island, thereby further effacing any historical ‘racial’ boundaries. This socioculturally 
and ethnically diverse population was then subject to successive crises — a series of serious 
epidemics including malaria and cholera, and the two World Wars during which the 
isolation of the island was felt acutely. Although living through these times together in 
many ways helped to unify the population and develop a Reunionese identity, 
departmentalisation in 1946 was not uniformly supported: the popularity of the island’s 
pro-independence movement has fluctuated ever since, unfortunately epitomised by anti-
government demonstrations in 1991 in which 10 people died. 
 
                                                
9 (“l’île vièrge”, D. Vaxelaire (2002) Portraits d’une île (Ste-Marie, Réunion: Azalées Éditions).) 
10 Y. Combeau & E. Maestri (2002) Histoire de La Réunion, Paris: Nathan. 



























With this historical background, and despite the lack of an indigenous population per se, 
the Créole community in Réunion has been and remains subject to the imposition of a 
dominant French culture in a situation analogous to that of colonial occupation. Discourses 
on colonialism therefore provide a useful framework within which to contextualise and 
examine representations of the Chikungunya epidemic in both Reunionese and metropolitan 
French newspapers. 
 
Representations in Reunionese Print Media: Témoignages and Clicanoo 
Newspapers both in Réunion and in metropolitan France were slow to pick up on the 
epidemic. There is no mention of Chikungunya in the Reunionese print media until April 
2005, by which time the INVS had already recorded 24 cases for March, and over 300 to 
date; and there is no mention of the epidemic in the metropolitan French print media until 
January 2006, almost a year after the first cases.11  Media reporting therefore demonstrates 
a considerable lag compared to the real-time evolution of the epidemic (see Table 1). 
 
In the Reunionese print media, the first articles to mention Chikungunya appear on 
20/4/2005 in both newspapers, but only as a passing comment about the Chikungunya 
epidemic in the Comores. The Clicanoo article is much longer than its Témoignages 
counterpart, and is more detailed and more practical insofar as it offers advice on mosquito 
eradication and limiting the disease risk. This difference already sets the trend for the main 
divergence between the two newspapers, but they are similar in their reporting delays. The 
first article to report cases in Réunion appears in Témoignages on 2/5/2005 reporting 4 
cases, and the second article appears two days later reporting 150 cases — on pages 6 and 9 
respectively, almost as general interest articles on health rather than as news items 
reflecting the appearance of a new virus with dramatic increases in case numbers. In 
Clicanoo, the first article to report cases in Réunion does not appear until a week later 
(11/5/2005), but articles are thereafter more frequent than in Témoignages; Table 1 shows 
the numbers of articles published by each newspaper in each month of the epidemic, 
                                                
11 The INVS (Institut National de Veillance Sanitaire (National Institute of Health Surveillance) is the 
national coordinating body for communicable disease surveillance and control, and has responsibility for 
reporting on epidemics for all departments of France, including the overseas departments of La Réunion, 
Martinique, Guadaloupe and Guyane). All departments provide disease surveillance data to the INVS, where 
data are analysed centrally and the results published in INVS bulletins. 



























highlighting this difference as well as showing the significant delay between the obvious 
increase in case numbers reported to the INVS and the priority given to print media 
reporting on the Chikungunya outbreak. These delays continue to be reflected in 
subsequent articles: the third and fourth articles in Témoignages appear 6 days later 
(20/5/2005 and 21/5/2005), and the fifth article a full 2 weeks later when case numbers 
have escalated to over 1000 cases. These articles are on pages 10, 6 and 8 respectively, still 
away from the front pages where apparently more newsworthy items are placed. The 
Clicanoo articles appear with greater frequency, rarely exceeding a week between articles, 
but also not showing any increase in frequency that might parallel the rapidly rising case 
numbers (See Table 1).  The case numbers are readily available but a delay of many weeks 
is evident in their use — much longer than can be accounted for by the delays of several 
days normally associated with disease notification and preliminary epidemiological 
analysis: during this time, an astute journalist could easily have become aware of the risk 
posed by the epidemic and would have been well positioned to produce front page news on 
it.  
 
Another aspect of these early reports is that they describe the epidemic in terms that appear 
to be the antithesis of sensationalism. The 14/5/2005 Témoignages article reports the 
disease as new (“touche pour la première fois l’océan Indien”), large (“épidémie de grand 
ampleur”), widespread (“présent dans tous les pays”), rapidly progressive (case numbers 
increasing as above), and serious (“symptômes graves”) — enough to ring alarm bells with 
people with no public health training whatsoever. Yet these terms are used in a factual way, 
spread through the text in a way that dilutes them, and are moderated by reassurances about 
official action, a paucity of hospitalised cases, the fact that infected people are not 
contagious, and the usually non-fatal nature of the virus. Overall, the risk of the epidemic is 
very understated in these early reports; the short, late, and infrequent articles convey an 
impression of a mild disease which is preventable and being dealt with effectively by the 
authorities. Clicanoo, with a slightly more populist reporting style that includes many 
anecdotal personal statements, goes so far as to suggest that Chikungunya is so trendy that 
one might almost want to catch it (“C’est la maladie à la mode […] qu’avec ce nom un brin 
exotique, on aurait presque envie de contracter la chikungunya”, Clicanoo, 25/5/2005). The 
epidemic is presented as a trivial addition to the other ‘tropical’ mosquito-borne diseases, 



























dengue and malaria, that are already familiar to the Réunionnese .12 The Témoignage 
reports are dealing with the epidemic as a non-event, a minor public health incident that 
does not constitute a significant risk on an island that is perceived as modern with a solid 
public health infrastructure (“Une cellule de veille des services de l’État [DRASS] a été 
mise en place….”, Témoignages 12/5/05. Clicanoo presents a clearer rôle for community 
involvement in combating the disease (“une lutte communautaire”, Clicanoo 14/5/2005), 
but is no better in these early articles at conveying a sense of urgency. 
 
There is no significant change in this delayed and downbeat reporting over the next few 
months; a full 6 weeks elapse between Témoignages articles 6 and 7 (15/6/2005 and 
22/7/2005) despite a corresponding jump in case numbers from 1,678 to 2,724 — and this 
during the southern winter/dry season when no vector-borne disease transmission would be 
expected (because of fewer mosquitoes). Témoignages articles 7 to 10 are very short, less 
than 200 words, but do add an invitation for new cases to contact the DRASS (Direction 
Regionale d’Affaires Sociales et Sanitaires) to help target mosquito control efforts. In the 
same period, Clicanoo publishes 23 articles specifically on Chikungunya, and also 
mentions the disease in other articles about, for example, football (which players are struck 
down, 18/6/2005) and teaching (what newly arriving teachers from France can expect, 
23/8/2005). More so than Témoignages, but still without sensationalism, there are 
suggestions here that people are being affected in more than a trivial way. Then, in late 
September/early October 2005, there is a dramatic change in the nature of media 
representations — the articles finally acknowledge the existence of an ‘unusual health 
event’, and blame the government for it. For the first time, Clicanoo highlights the 
DRASS’s failure to control the epidemic: the outbreak is now acknowledged to have never 
abated, despite the southern winter, and government incompetence is cited as the cause 
(“defaut d’organisation”, Clicanoo 12/9/2005). Later, but more vehemently, Témoignages 
follows suit on 13/10/2005 with an article that is suddenly much longer, more that 800 
words, and highlights both the severity and potential for recrudescence of the epidemic with 
the onset of the southern summer. Articles become more frequent (in the order of days, then 
                                                
12 Malaria first appeared in Réunion in 1869, was declared eradicated in 1973, and now only imported cases 
continue to occur. Dengue first appeared in 1873, and although also at one stage eradicated (1952), introduced 
cases seeded further epidemics in 1977-78 and 2004, as well as concurrently with the 2005-6 Chikungunya 
epidemic. 



























moving to sometimes two articles per day), and fundamentally different in content. During 
the 2 months’ interval between the 10th Témoignages article and the 11th, the existence of 
an ‘unusual health event’ has finally been accepted: it is reported that the southern winter 
has not interrupted transmission, that there have now been over 4,000 notified cases, that 
serious complications have arisen, including foetal infections and meningitis and, 
importantly, that a whole-of-community approach is necessary to combat the epidemic 
(“L’État seul ne pourra pas éradiquer le virus”; Témoignages 13/10/2005). The weight of 
evidence has made it impossible to deny the severity of the epidemic any longer.  
 
Accepting that the epidemic was worse than thought and that a recrudescence in the 
oncoming summer would seem inevitable, articles now firmly blame the government for 
failing to control the situation. The issue is quickly politicised, and questions are asked in 
both newspapers about the adequacy of the evaluation of the epidemic, the appropriateness 
of the public health response, and the apparent tendency of the government to avoid blame 
by transferring the responsibility for controlling the epidemic to families and local 
communities.13 Although individual and community involvement in source reduction 
(removal of potential breeding sites) is essential in urban mosquito-borne disease control, 
the spraying of insecticides at a broad scale by competent operators is obviously beyond the 
capability of local communities (“…n’est pas possible [..] aux agents d’une commune 
d’appliquer un tel traitement”, Témoignages 14/110/05). In an angry letter signed by 32 
local general medical practitioners and reproduced in Témoignages 18/1/06, a major point 
is made of the inappropriateness of blaming the Reunionese for allowing the virus to 
spread, when mosquito control at a departmental scale needs to led by the government. 
More generally the government is accused of failing to protect the health of the public 
(“Les services de l’État ont failli à leur mission de protection de la santé publique”, 
Témoignages 14/10/2005), despite having had a warning from the World Health 
Organization several years earlier that the virus was serious enough to be considered as a 
                                                
13  In urban environments, vector-borne disease control depends on top-down and bottom-up management 
approaches working synergistically. Ultimately only individual householders can eliminate all the containers 
of standing water that might provide suitable environments for mosquito larvae (garbage, pot plants, blocked 
gutters, old tyres, etc.); but only governments can coordinate the large-scale spraying of insecticides required 
to kill larvae in larger water bodies, or to ‘knock-down’ adult mosquitoes during an epidemic. 



























potential agent of bioterrorism.14 This latter argument finally demonstrates the type of 
sensationalism one might have expected when faced with an ‘unusual health event’, and the 
emotive term “bioterrorism” now appears in the title of an article promoted to page 3 (“Le 
bioterrorisme peut utiliser le chikungunya”, Témoignages 17/10/2005). A barrage of 
interventions that could have or should have been implemented are identified in subsequent 
articles: why was WHO assistance not requested from the beginning, as it was in Comores 
during the same outbreak? Why is there no attempt to devise a specific treatment or 
antidote? Why is the disease burden underestimated and trivialised when an equivalent 
problem in metropolitan France would have precipitated a massive response? For each of 
these questions, the responsibilities and failures are projected onto the (French 
Metropolitan) government, allowing the island and its inhabitants to assume the role of 
victims. 
 
In the subsequent months, new themes are introduced and additional issues raised in 
relation to the epidemic, including control campaigns, loss of tourism income, and 
environmental concern about insecticides; but the undercurrent of public outrage remains 
consistently represented and firmly anti-government — if control campaigns are 
unsuccessful, if tourist income is lost, and if local ecosystems are poisoned, these effects 
remain squarely a result of governmental mismanagement. Insofar as these media 
representations are likely to reflect public opinion, their consistency illustrates the fact that 
perceived health risks and the trust of public health organizations are mental constructs that 
are very difficult to shift once formed.15 One does, however, have to admire the creativity 
of the Reunionese, examples of which include blaming al- Qaida (Clicanoo, 14/2/06) and 
issuing an album of Séga, the local dance music, with a Chikungunya theme (Clicanoo, 
15/6/06); but the shift from passive denial to acceptance with active government 
                                                
14 WHO (World Health Organization) (2002)  Se préparer pour faire face à l'usage délibéré d'agents 
biologiques: Pour une approche rationelle face à l'impensable , Geneva: World Health Organization. This 
WHO report summarises the requirements for minimising the potential impact of microbial pathogens used as 
agents of bioterrorism. It lists the agents of potential concern (which include Chikungunya virus), and outlines 
global surveillance and response needs to limit the spread of epidemics. The recommended strengthening of 
surveillance systems would equally improve countries’ ability to respond effectively to “emerging infectious 
diseases”. 
15 M. L. Finucane (2004) “The psychology of risk judgements and decisions”, in N. Cromar, S. Cameron & H. 
Fallowfield (eds) Environmental Health, South Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 



























denunciation is the only significant transition in representation evident in Témoignages and 
Clicanoo up to the end of the epidemic in November 2006. 
 
Representations in French Metropolitan Print Media:  
Le Figaro and Le Monde 
The first mention of Chikungunya in the metropolitan print media studied is in Le Monde 
on 16/12/2005: a technically detailed and politically neutral article reports on the disease 
and its presence in Réunion, including the control efforts being implemented. The article is 
an outlier insofar as the next mention does not occur for another 5 weeks, but the fact that 
this information is available and has appeared without being followed up is an indication of 
the low priority placed on reporting on such a ‘tropical’ health issue — at least until a 
‘mediagenic’ controversy is later identified. In Le Figaro (21/1/2006) the first article 
appears almost a full year after the first cases were registered by the INVS; and it is not so 
much about the epidemic per se, but about the conflict (“polémique”) between the island’s 
general medical practitioners and the government public health services. In a letter by local 
general practitioners, the government is accused of underestimating the extent of the 
epidemic, of not taking appropriate action, and of inappropriately blaming the islanders for 
allowing the virus to spread (see also above, Témoignages 18/1/06). This attack on the 
French metropolitan government health services and representatives remains the theme for 
the next four articles in Le Figaro: case numbers are presented in support of the general 
practitioners’ claim, but official rebuttals are also documented and include statements of the 
massive commitment of personnel to mosquito control (Figaro 28/1/2006), the 
implementation of a surveillance system by the INVS (Figaro 30/1/2006), and official 
confirmation that the situation is under control (“Le probleme est réglé”, Figaro 
30/1/2006).   
 
Le Monde is initially less focused on this controversy and again provides articles that 
appear to be richer in factual detail, explaining the need for mosquito control and the 
appearance of severe complications not previously recorded (29/1/2006, 4/2/2006). 
However, a very metro-centric interest is apparent even from the early articles: the 
emphasis is on the metropolitan public health officials’ thoughts on the epidemics, the 



























metropolitan mosquito controllers being sent to Réunion, and the economic consequences 
for the tourism industry. The Director General of Health is quoted as explaining that the 
unusual circumstances arise because a developing world epidemic has established itself in 
the developed world (“...une épidémie de pays en voie de développement qui survivent [sic] 
dans un pays dévelopé”, Le Monde 4/2/2006). The controversy is picked up more on 
8/2/2006, highlighting the rapid spread of the epidemic despite the large number of 
government driven interventions. Le Figaro has in the interim picked up on the inundation 
of the island’s hospitals reaching crisis point (“tous les hôpitaux de l’île [vivent] en état de 
crise”, Le Figaro 6/2/2006), with the theme of controversy still remaining dominant: the 
Reunionese are reported as feeling abandoned and panicked despite many personnel, much 
financial support, and free anti-mosquito kits being provided by the government. The 
statement “They had forgotten that they were an Indian Ocean island” (“La Réunion a 
oublié qu’elle était une île de l’ océan Indian”, Le Figaro 6/2/2006) indicates that the 
islanders should not be so surprised by an epidemic of tropical disease since their island is, 
after all, in the tropics. 
 
In Le Figaro, the epidemic per se (disease burden, spread) only becomes the dominant 
theme when it is realised that the vector mosquito, Aedes albopictus, also occurs in 
metropolitan France — and that an importation risk for Chikungunya may therefore exist 
(Le Figaro 9/2/2006, 25/2/2006). From this point on, the polemical differences of opinion 
between islanders and officials take a back seat, and information about the epidemic is 
presented in three major areas that are presumably of direct interest to the metropolitan 
readership, now increasingly aware of the threat to metropolitan France: the seriousness of 
the disease once contracted, the latest research findings, and the appropriateness of the 
public health response. Severity of infection: although originally thought to be benign, the 
severe complications that can arise are now highlighted (Le Figaro 18/2/2006), particularly 
neonatal meningoencephalitis (Le Figaro 27/2/2006), and Chikungunya-associated 
mortality which has never before been recorded (“Premier décès attribué au chikungunya”, 
Figaro 6/3/2006). The seriousness of the disease becomes a major tourist deterrent (Figaro 
23/2/2006, 1/3/2006). Research findings: knowledge generation about the ‘tropical disease’ 
becomes a priority, and is coordinated by a newly formed national research centre with 
over 9 million euros of funding (Le Figaro 22/2/2006, 27/2/2006). The aim is to establish 



























why severe symptoms never before recorded have appeared in this epidemic. A major 
launch of research on the island is highlighted at the end of February (Le Figaro 
28/2/2006). Appropriateness of response: the official management of the epidemic is now 
described as possibly negligent (Le Figaro 22/2/2006) bordering on a total stuff-up 
(“gabegie totale”, Le Figaro 23/2/2006), and emphasising that virtually nothing was done 
in terms of health promotion (community education about control and avoidance measures). 
Some 76 million euros are invested to provide free medication and repellents to the needy, 
to step up mosquito control, to fund research, and to revitalise the devastated tourist 
industry (Le Figaro 27/2/2006). 
 
No similar change is reflected in Le Monde, where the importation risk is not highlighted 
and the emphasis continues to remain on other metropolitan issues — the travels to the 
island of the President and Ministers (24/2/2006 and following), and the arrangements for 
tourists to rebook their flights for later travel without penalty (16/2/2006). The islanders are 
nevertheless afforded an intermittent voice, and here too the feeling of abandonment comes 
through strongly — particularly when the attention paid to their epidemic is compared to 
the far greater interest shown in bird flu (“Les poulets sont plus importants que les 
Réunionnais”, Le Monde 22/2/2006).16 
From March 2006, a significant decrease in the number of cases is reported (“épidémie en 
repli”, Le Monde 14/3/06; “décru spectaculaire”; Le Figaro 30/3/2006), and subsequent 
articles on the Réunion epidemic are limited to reporting on this continuing downward 
trend in both numbers of cases and in impact. Some selected research findings are 
discussed intermittently, and there is then an ever-decreasing interest shown (which reflects 
in both the number and content of articles), until the end of the epidemic and study period 
in November 2006. 
 
 
                                                
16 Although ‘Bird Flu’ virus is closely related to human influenza virus and can infect people, without a 
significant mutation it cannot be transmitted from person to person. Because Bird Flu was and (at the time of 
writing) remains epizootic (epidemic in animals) on a global scale, and because the possibility of mutation to 
cause a human flu pandemic remains, there is a global ‘hysteria’ to prepare for the worst. It is understandable 
that a population experiencing an actual epidemic of Chikungunya should be cynical about the 
disproportionate amount of time, energy and funding being spent on a potential epidemic of flu. 




























A key finding in analysing these media reports is the significant delay in reporting on the 
epidemic: firstly in the Réunionnnais newspapers, suggesting passive denial in the early 
stages of the epidemic; and secondly, in the French metropolitan newspapers, suggesting 
that residual colonialist thinking may be influencing the priority placed on reporting on 
such an epidemic in a remote tropical location. It is possible that a contributing factor to the 
delays is also a failure of public health officials to adequately communicate the potential 
gravity of the situation to the media and public; Watin highlights the apparent lack of 
interest of public health authorities in the early stages of the epidemic,17 and we have 
previously shown that the rhetoric of the official INVS bulletins on the epidemic reflected 
an underestimate of the potential public health risk posed by Chikungunya.18 However, 
regular INVS bulletins giving case numbers were readily available to journalists from the 
first month of the epidemic (see Table 1.), so we argue here that the delays were more 
likely to result from a low publication priority for reporting on the epidemic for either or 
both of the above reasons: early denial and postcolonialist trivialisation of the public health 
risk posed by the virus. 
 
The manner in which public health risk is constructed is a result of risk perception — a 
social construct in which health hazards are mentally ‘scaled’ from negligible to 
catastrophic based on characteristics of the hazard itself as well as on attributes of 
individuals in the population of interest. To better understand such ‘scaling’, the relevant 
characteristics of hazards have been construed in terms of ‘personalities’ defined 
predominantly by “dread risk” and “unknown risk”.19 Dread risk is the extent to which the 
hazard is dreaded by the community, with strong elements of lack of control, being 
involuntary, inequitable, and potentially fatal or catastrophic: for example, nuclear reactor 
accidents are perceived as posing a greater risk to health than does smoking. Unknown risk 
                                                
17 M. Watin M (in press)  « Polémique, rumeur et tension: Aspects de la « crise » du chikungunya dans 
l’espace publique médiatique réunionnais », in Chronique d’une crise sanitaire, économique et sociale: L’île 
de La Réunion face au Chikungunya, Paris: UMR Prodig, Infogéo. 
18 Weinstein and Ravi 2008. 
19 P. Slovic, T. Malmfors, C.K. Mertz, N. Neil & I.F.H. Purchase (1997) “Evaluating chemical risks: results 
of a survey of the British Toxicology Society”, Human and Experimental Toxicology 16: 289-304; P. Slovic 
(1998) “The risk game”, Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety 59: 73-7; Finucane 2004. 



























is the extent to which the risk is unfamiliar to the community, with strong elements of 
unobservability, lack of understanding, and delayed consequences: for example, pesticides 
and asbestos are perceived as posing a greater risk to health than do car accidents. The 
‘personality’ of a hazard is the mix of dread risk and unknown risk that it presents, and at 
the media and community level is obviously strongly influenced by the perceivers’ 
particular mix of age, gender, ethnicity, education, sociopolitical attitudes, and belief 
systems (including religion). In the specific case of the Réunion Chikungunya epidemic, 
different Reunionese with different backgrounds and experience therefore perceived the 
risk of mosquito-borne diseases differently: for example, residents of European origin were 
very concerned about being bitten by these (unknown, tropical) insects, as reflected in the 
media by their complaints about the inadequacy of mosquito control efforts. Their feelings 
of lack of control were exacerbated by feelings of abandonment (inequity), leading to 
heightened perceptions of  “dread” risk. The non-white Créole community, on the other 
hand, perceive the (known, local) mosquitoes only as a nuisance, against which herbal 
repellents provide adequate protection (Le Monde, 23/2/06); they thus have control and, in 
any case, often do not believe that mosquitoes cause the disease. 
 
In the metropolitan newspapers, the perception of the severity of the public health risk 
posed by the disease, and the need to understand (research) and control it, take on new 
significance after the realisation that the epidemic could pose a threat to residents of 
metropolitan France (Le Figaro 9/2/2206, and “Plus proche que l’on ne croit”, 25/2/2006). 
While the disease was seen as a purely tropical phenomenon, the central government could 
afford to relax (“Le fait qu’il s’agisse d’un départment d’outre-mer a sans doute conduit le 
pouvoir central à une certaine négligence”, Figaro 22/2/2006). With the possible threat to 
metropolitan France identified, the rhetoric of the newspaper articles changes to one of a 
more inclusive approach to ‘health for all’, with suggestions such as the modification of 
national surveillance systems to better deal with emerging infectious diseases (Le Figaro, 
2/2/2006).20 There is a realisation that to decrease the public health risk to their own 
populations, Western countries need to invest in protecting the health of more vulnerable 
populations in developing and tropical countries that can act as sources of emerging 
                                                
20 See note 20, above. 



























infectious diseases (Le Figaro, 3/3/2006).  Such an approach is consistent with recent 
developments in international public health policy, and where better for France to start 
reducing this international risk of emerging infectious diseases than in one of its own 
overseas departments?21 
 
There are representations in the French metropolitan print media that clearly indicate a 
persistence of colonialist thinking in officialdom. Two examples have been cited: the 
explanation of a third world disease impinging on the developed world, and the lack of 
surprise that might have been anticipated when a tropical disease occurred on a tropical 
island (above; Le Monde, 4/2/2006; Le Figaro 6/2/2006). The emphasis on research 
provides another such example: although not apparent until more than a year after the onset 
of the epidemic, the new research emphasis can be interpreted as a scholarisation of the 
problem.  An academic approach to knowledge generation allows metropolitan public 
health officials and politicians to distance themselves from the very real suffering, 
including deaths, to which over 250,000 people - one third of the island’s population - were 
subject. This process of officialdom distancing itself from the epidemic is similar to one 
evident in the INVS reports on Chikungunya, which represent the epidemic in tropicalist 
terms with a degree of unempathetic ‘othering’ of Indian Ocean health events.22 The effects 
of these colonialist representations are to contribute both directly and indirectly to the 
perceived risk posed by Chikungunya: directly because they allow officialdom to distance 
itself from the risk by ‘othering’ the disease to the remote tropics, and therefore perceiving 
no risk to metropolitan France; and indirectly because such representations influence the 
formation of risk perceptions by the (metropolitan) readership. 
 
The Reunionese newspapers, by contrast, contain few representations of the nature of the 
risk, but focus strongly on the attribution of blame for the risk. After an initial period of 
apparent denial of the presence of a potential public health hazard, the presence of such a 
hazard is accepted and blamed firmly on the government. Poumadère describes this 
                                                
21 WHO (World Health Organization) (2000) Consensus meeting on surveillance of infectious diseases: 
Report on a WHO meeting, Grottaferrata, Italy 4-7 April 2000, Regional Office for Europe: World Health 
Organization. 
22 For detailed discussion, see Weinstein and Ravi 2008. 



























transition as reflecting the change from social attenuation to social amplification of the 
constructed risk (passage de l’atténuation à l’amplification sociales de ce risque)23 and 
there is also the possibility of an element of reciprocity here insofar as the media itself may 
have influenced the public perceptions of risk posed by the epidemic.24 From a certain 
perspective, this dichotomous representation of the epidemic — with passive denial on one 
hand and acceptance with active government denunciation on the other —reflect the 
dichotomous aspects of Reunionese identity. Denial “haunts the contemporary Reunionese 
discourse”, with a violent history of slavery, indentured labour and colonialism still not 
being adequately acknowledged.25 In such an historical environment, Glissant interprets 
passive denial as a cultural trait that results from that environment itself; only physically 
strong but passive slaves survived.26 And there was suffering. Suffering “turns into lament, 
lament into anger, anger into violence [...] against France”, providing an undercurrent that 
persists through two centuries of slavery and one century of colonialism right up to the 
present day.27 Thus, once the scale and extent of suffering from Chikungunya infection 
became undeniable, the suffering turned to anger against the ‘French’ government, with 
representations in the media reflecting this by means of fervent denunciations. “Que font 
les élus?” (What are the elected representatives doing?) is often heard in relation to any 
discontent on Réunion, and in a sense is ‘othering’ the problems of the island onto 
metropolitan France.28 This is a direct reversal of the metropolitan ‘othering’ of tropical 
diseases that is evident as ‘distancing’ (discussed above), and can be interpreted as a form 
of “writing back”.29 
 
                                                
23 B. Poumadère (2007) « Le Chikungunya à la Réunion: entre atténuation et amplification sociales du 
risque » in Abstracts, Chikungunya et autres arboviroses émergentes en milieu tropical (CRVOI and INVS, 
3-4 December 2007, Saint-Pierre, La Réunion): 340. 
24 B. Idelson (2007) « L’épidémie de Chikungunya à la Réunion, medias, opinion publique et pouvoirs 
publiques dans la crise » in Abstracts, Chikungunya et autres arboviroses émergentes en milieu tropical 
(CRVOI and INVS, 3-4 December 2007, Saint-Pierre, La Réunion): 339. 
25 F. Vergès (2003) “The Island of Wandering Souls” in R. Edmond & V. Smith (eds.) Islands in History and 
Representation, London: Routlege Research in Postcolonial Literatures, p.162. 
26 E. Glissant (1981) Le Discours antillais, Paris: Seuil, p.101. 
27 Vergès 2003: 162. 
28 Vergès 2003: 165. 
29 B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths & H. Tiffin (1989) The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice on Post-
Colonial Literatures, London: Routledge. 



























An interesting debate is that surrounding the extent and appropriateness of involvement of 
Reunionese in mosquito control to combat the epidemic. Complaints about the lack of 
health promotion activities and community involvement have been presented above (Le 
Figaro, 23/2/2006), and are reinforced by descriptions of hundreds of mosquito controllers 
being deployed from metropolitan France, rather than enlisting local Reunionese (Le 
Monde, 22/2/2006). However, it could be argued that placing more emphasis on enlisting 
locals in mosquito control operations could have jeopardised such operations: a full two 
thirds of Reunionese do not believe that the disease is mosquito-borne, and are therefore 
unlikely to have embraced the campaign efficiently and effectively.30  Some insight into the 
local belief systems that result in this situation is provided in the form of a report about a 
lady who has used citronella (a herbal mosquito repellent) for the last 40 years, and has 
always been all right so does not believe that the ill could originate from the insects (Le 
Monde, 23/2/2007). Such a belief is reinforced by the observation that the mosquitoes are 
being killed, but that the epidemic is worsening. A hospital psychologist explains that in 
times of crisis old beliefs and superstitions resurface (Le Monde, 23/2/2007), and Réunion 
is well known for a preponderance of such beliefs.31 Thus an exploration of local belief 
systems would appear integral, even critical, to managing an ‘unusual health event’ in the 
multicultural environment of Réunion, particularly with respect to informing health 
education and public health practice about what approaches might be most culturally 
appropriate on the island.  
 
Belief systems are fundamental modulators of people’s risk perception and their subsequent 
health protective behaviour,32 yet consideration of these cultural aspects may have been 
overlooked in the top-down management of the Chikungunya epidemic by the French 
metropolitan government. Religion, in particular, stands out as a determinant of perceived 
                                                
30 B-A, Gaüzère and P. Aubry (2006) Le chik, le choc, le cheque, Sainte-Marie (Réunion): Azalées Éditions, 
p. 25. 
31 As a result of the varied ethnic makeup of the Reunionese, a great variety of belief systems coexist and 
mingle on the island, ranging from animist magic of Malagasy origin, through Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic 
beliefs, to Roman Catholicism. An example of the interesting interactions between these religions is afforded 
by the grave of the late 19th century sorcerer and bandit Le Sitarane in St-Pierre: black magic rites are 
practiced at his grave in a Catholic cemetery — the latter incidentally also providing a variety of water 
holding containers for both flowers and mosquito larvae. 
32 M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky (1982) Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technical and 
environmental dangers, Berkley: University of California Press. 



























risk, and forms the subject of another discussion which is beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Perceptions of risk are rapidly formed and difficult to alter, making it imperative to 
explore the potential influence of different belief systems before an understanding of them 
becomes critical to the management of an ‘unusual health event’. Armed with this 
knowledge, public health practitioners could have a more powerful opportunity to reduce 
the community burden of disease, because they are then in a position of influencing the 
early formation of different community perceptions of risk, and thus also the translation of 
those perceived risks into public health practice. We have shown here that such an 
approach could be particularly valuable in a multicultural society where community 
perceptions of risk may be different from those predicted in a Western paradigm. 





























The number of cases of Chikungunya by month and the corresponding numbers of print 
media reports mentioning Chikungunya. A considerable delay is evident between the first 
occurrence of cases and the first articles in the Reunionese newspapers Témoignages and 
Clicanoo; a further delay is evident before the appearance of articles in the metropolitan 
French newspapers Le Figaro and Le Monde. 
 
 
Month Number  Number of articles     
  of cases* Témoig. Clicanoo+ Le Figaro Le Monde 
February 05 0 0 0 0 0 
March 24 0 0 0 0 
April 281 1 1 0 0 
May 1486 4 10 0 0 
June 1234 2 9 0 0 
July 449 1 3 0 0 
August 410 3 5 0 0 
Sept 458 0 7 0 0 
Oct 616 11 15 0 0 
Nov 967 9 24 0 0 
Dec 6667 20 19 0 1 
January 06 54136 77 146 6 2 
Feb 127073 169 482 41 34 
March 45202 70 319 29 13 
April 14667 31 116 11 7 
May 5267 20 91 10 11 
June 2700 17 65 1 2 
July 141 20 48 2 1 
August 90 12 45 3 1 
Sept 57 10 67 6 1 
Oct 57 9 56 4 3 
Nov 32 6 40 2 2 
 
Based both on notifications (before Dec 05 and after June 06) and estimates (Dec 05 to June 
06 inclusive) from the INVS (2005-6). 
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